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ABSTRACT. We suggest that extending Muller games with preference ordering for players is a
natural way to reason about unbounded duration games. In this context, we look at the standard
solution concept of Nash equilibrium for non-zero sum games. We show that Nash equilibria always
exists for such generalised Muller games on finite graphs and present a procedure to compute an
equilibrium strategy profile. We also give a procedure to compute a subgame perfect equilibrium
when it exists in such games.
1 Introduction
Infinite two player games on graphs have been shown to have various applications in differ-
ent branches of mathematics and computer science. These are games played on a directed
graph where players take turns to move and trace out a path in the graph. The winning
condition is given by a set of infinite paths. Such games are well studied in descriptive set
theory and topology in the form of Banach-Mazur games. In computer science these are
commonly used as models of games in verification and synthesis of open reactive systems.
The key question of interest for such games is that of determinacy. That is, whether one of
the players always has a winning strategy. It turns out that determinacy depends crucially
on the topological properties of the winning set. A celebrated result by Martin [7] showed
that all games with Borel winning conditions are determined.
Martin’s result however, does not make any assertion as to whether it is possible to de-
termine who the winner is or how “complex” the winning strategy is. These turn out to be
the core questions in solving the verification and synthesis problems as well. Winning con-
ditions for games which arise in computer science are typically specified as logical formulas
in S1S, first order logic or LTL and are therefore regular conditions. A seminal result due
to Bu¨chi and Landweber [1] says that for games played on finite graphs where the wining
condition is specified as a Muller set, the winner can be determined and that the winning
strategy can be effectively synthesised in finite memory strategies.
A natural generalisation of two player zero sum games is multi-player games where
each player has a win-lose objective. Players’ objectives are allowed to overlap and therefore
these define non-zero sumgames. For non-zero sumgames, determinacy is usually replaced
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by one of the most important solution concepts in game theory, that of Nash equilibrium: a
strategy profile where none of the players have an incentive to deviate unilaterally. It has
been shown in [3] that every multiplayer game with Borel winning condition has a Nash
equilibrium (see [2] for a detailed exposition). The main idea here is the effective use of
threat strategies whereby a player deviating from the equilibrium profile is punished by
others to receive the outcome which she can guarantee on her own. For games where the
win-lose objectives are regular, an equilibrium profile can be effectively synthesized as well.
For games of infinite duration, it is questionable whether Nash equilibrium defines a
satisfactory notion of rational behaviour. A more refined concept is that of subgame perfect
equilibrium which takes into account perturbations of players as well. The existence of
subgame perfect equilibrium for multiplayer games with win-lose objectives was shown
in [9]. [5] unifies both results and shows that the crucial requirement for the existence of
equilibrium for such multiplayer games is the determinacy of the underlying two player
games.
From a game theoretic perspective, it is quite natural to consider games where players
have utilities associated with plays rather than just win-lose conditions. We suggest that
in case we restrict our attention to classifying regular plays then this can be captured in
terms of a generalised Muller game. These are Muller games where instead of interpreting
the Muller table as defining win-lose conditions, we associate utilities over the sets in the
Muller table. Such games define non-zero sum objectives for players and we can therefore
ask the question whether Nash equilibrium always exists for this class of games. In this
context we show the following results:
• Nash equilibrium always exists for generalised Muller games played on finite graphs.
• An equilibrium profile can be effectively synthesized.
One could employ threat strategies to show the existence of equilibrium. However, for
infinite games with non-zero sum objectives, even coming up with rationality assumptions
which justify the use of such strategies is a challenging task. On the other hand, backward
inductive equilibrium profiles are known to be more versatile in the case of finite games. We
show that the standard backward induction algorithm [10] can be effectively used to prove
the existence of Nash equilibrium and to synthesize an equilibrium profile in generalised
Muller games.
Subgame perfect equilibria in general need not exists for such games. However, we
show that:
• It is decidable to check whether subgame perfect equilibrium exists in a generalised
Muller game.
• It is possible to effectively synthesize a subgame perfect equilibrium profile (when it
exists).
2 Preliminaries
We begin with a description of the game arena and the objectives of the players. We look at
unbounded duration, turn based games played on finite graphs.
PAUL, SIMON FSTTCS 2009 337
2.1 Game Arena
A game G consists of an arena A and an objective Win. For a directed graph A = (V, E)
and for a node v ∈ V, let vE = {v′ | (v, v′) ∈ E}. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players. A
game arena is a finite graphA = (V, E) whereV is the set of game positions and E ⊆ V×V
is the move relation. V is partitioned into setsV = V1 ∪ . . .∪Vn where for all i ∈ N, Vi is the
set of game positions of player i. For simplicity we assume that for all v ∈ V, the set vE is
nonempty. An initialised game is a game G along with a starting vertex v0 ∈ V. Henceforth
when we use the notation (G, v0), we will generally mean an initialised game with initial
vertex v0.
Given a game (G, v0), a play in (G, v0) can be viewed as follows: initially a token is
placed at vertex v0. At any point, if the token is at a vertex v ∈ Vi (i.e. a player i vertex) then
she moves the token to some v′ ∈ vE. In this way an infinite path, pi = v0v1 . . . where for all
j > 0 we have (vj−1, vj) ∈ E, called a play is constructed in the arena.
For a finite sequence ρ = v0v1 . . . vk let first(ρ) = v0, last(ρ) = vk and for an infinite
sequence pi = v0v1 . . . let inf(pi) denote the set of nodes that appear infinitely often in pi.
For any sequence pi = v0v1 . . ., let pi(i) denote the ith element of pi, pii denote the length i
prefix of pi, |pi|v denote the number of v’s occuring in pi and Occ(pi) = {v | |pi|v > 0}.
2.2 Strategies
A strategy for player i specifies at each game position of i which move to choose. It is a
function σi : V
∗Vi → V from the set of all finite plays (histories) ending in a player i node to
the set of game positions which satisfies the condition:
• for all pi = v0 . . . vk, such that vk ∈ Vi, σi(pi) ∈ vkE.
Let TA denote the tree unfolding of A. A strategy σi can also be thought of as a subtree Tσi
of TA (called the strategy tree) where for each player i node there is a unique outgoing edge
and for any other player node, we include all the edges.
A strategy σ is said to be bounded memory if there exists a finite state machine M =
(M, g, h,mI) where M is the memory of the strategy, mI ∈ M is the initial memory, g :
V ×M → M the memory update function, and h : V ×M → V is the output function which
specifies the choice of the player such that if v0 . . . vk is a play and m0 . . .mk+1 is a sequence
determined by m0 = mI and mi+1 = g(vi,mi) then σ(v0 . . . vk) = h(vk ,mk+1). The strategy σ
is said to be memoryless if M is a singleton.
Let Ωi denote the set of all strategies for player i. A strategy profile σ¯ = (σ1, . . . , σn)
defines a unique play in the game, we use piσ¯ to denote this play. We often use the notation
ı¯ to denote the set N \ {i} and σ¯−i to denote the tuple (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σi+1, . . . , σn).
2.3 Objectives
The arena specifies the rules of the game and the moves of the players. To describe a game
fully, the objectives of the players have to be specified. The players play in a way that they
can ‘achieve/avoid’ these objectives. The objective of a player is usually a subset ot the set of
plays. However, for algorithmic analysis, the objectives need to be finitely presentable. The
most widely studied of these presentations are ω-regular objectives, mean-payoff objectives
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and so on. These naturally arise in the specifications encountered in the verification and
synthesis of reactive systems. In this paper we concentrate on a specific type of ω-regular
objective, the Muller objective.
Binary Objectives: In this case the objective of each player i is an omega regular subset
Win of plays. The game is not antagonistic since objectives of players are allowed to over-
lap. For instance, for Muller objectives, each player i has a collection Fi of Muller sets. She
wins the game if and only if the game eventually settles down to some subset F of the set
of vertices V such that F ∈ Fi; otherwise she loses. We often call these objectives ‘win-lose
objectives’.
Generalised Objectives: In this paper we are concerned with games where players have
preference orderings on the various Muller sets. Formally, player i has a total order ⊑i on
the Muller sets. Such an ordering can also be viewed as an utility function ui : 2
V → N.
Since a strategy profile σ¯ ∈ Πni=1Ωi defines a unique Muller set F = inf(piσ¯), we may also
think of ui to be a function from ui : Π
n
i=1Ωi → N. We call such games generalised Muller
games.
2.4 Best Response and Equilibrium
The notion of best response and equilibrium is defined as follows:
• A strategy σi of player i is said to be a best response for σ¯−i if for all σ′i ∈ Ωi,
ui(pi(σ¯−i,σ′i )) ≤ ui(pi(σ¯−i,σi)).
• A strategy tuple σ¯ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is a Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ N, σi is the best
response for σ¯−i.
• A subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) [8] can be defined in our setting as follows. Let
ρ be a (finite) path in the arena A. Given a strategy σi for player i, the strategy σi(ρ)
is defined to be a function: σi(ρ) : ρV
∗Vi → V such that σi(ρ)(ρ
′) = σi(ρρ
′). Let σ¯(ρ)
denote the tuple (σ1(ρ), . . . , σn(ρ)). A strategy tuple σ¯ in the initialised game (G, v0)
is said to be an SPE if for every vertex v in A and for every path ρ from v0 to v in A,
σ¯(ρ) is a Nash equilibrium for the initialised game (G, v).
2.5 Computing Nash Equilibrium
In [3], the authors show that n-player games with win-lose Borel objectives always have
a Nash equilibrium. An equilibrium profile is where the players play ‘threat’ strategies in
that, if any player i unilaterally deviates from her prescribed behaviour, all the other players
punish her by playing a profile where she can never gain anything more than what she
would have had she stuck to her prescribed strategy. The procedure can be appropriately
modified to show that Nash equilibrium always exists in a generalised Muller game.
Threat strategies are naturally defined in the case of games with win-lose objectives.
However, with general non-zero sum games, it is not clear whether threat strategies consti-
tute ‘efficient’ solutions profiles. For finite games backward inductive solution profiles are
known to preserve nice properties like Pareto efficiency [4]. Here we show that the standard
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backward induction procedure can be effectively utilised for computing Nash equilibria in
generalised Muller games.
3 Solving Generalised Games
In this section, we develop our procedure for solving generalised Muller games and prove
its correctness. The central idea of the procedure is to perform a finite unfolding of the game
arena, making use of the ‘latest appearance record’ (LAR) data structure [6] and apply a
backward induction on this unfolding.
3.1 The LAR Tree
LetA = (V, E) be a finite graph and ♯ /∈ V. Let ≺ be a total order on the nodes of V. We Let
LA = {l ∈ (V ∪ {♯})
|V|+1 | |l|♯ = 1∧ ∀v ∈ V(|l|v = 1)}
The set LA is called the LAR memory. Henceforth we shall refer to elements from LA
as x♯y where x, y ∈ V∗. We define a function next : LA ×V → LA as
next(x♯y, v) =


x′♯x′′yv iff x♯y = x′vx′′♯y
xy′♯y′′v iff x♯y = x♯y′vy′′
x♯y iff x♯y = x♯y′v
For a finite play ρ = v0v1 . . . vk in the arena we define LAR(ρ) inductively as:
• LAR(v0)=x♯v0 where x is ordered according to the total order ≺.
• LAR(v0 . . . vi)=next(LAR(v0 . . . vi−1),vi), i ≥ 1.
Given an arena A = (V, E) and an element x♯y ∈ LA the (finite) LAR tree Tfin(A, x♯y)
corresponding to A and x♯y, or just Tfin(x♯y) when the arena A is fixed, is constructed as
follows:
• x♯y is the root of Tfin(x♯y).
• For any node x′♯y′v of Tfin(x♯y), and for all u ∈ vE, x
′′♯y′′ = next(x′♯y′v, u) is a child
of x′♯y′v iff there is no node x′′♯y′′ in the unique path from the root to x′♯y′v, or x′′♯y′′
is the first node to repeat in the path.
That Tfin(x♯y) is well defined follows from the fact that the function next is well defined.
And the fact that Tfin(x♯y) is finite can be ascertained by noting that along any sequence of
the elements of LA of length (|V|+ 1)! + 1, at least one element is bound to repeat, by the
pigeonhole principle.
3.2 Ensuring a Muller Set
Let A = (V, E) be an arena, v0 be an initial vertex and Tfin(x♯v0) be the LAR tree of A
corresponding to the LAR x♯v0 where x is ordered according to the total order ≺. Let F ⊆
2V be a collection Muller sets and M ( N,M 6= ∅ be a subset of players. We label the
leaf nodes of Tfin(x♯v0) with F or F¯ as follows. For a leaf node x♯y of Tfin(x♯v0), let ρ be
the unique path in Tfin(x♯v0) from the root to x♯y. Let ρ
′ be the least suffix of ρ such that
first(ρ′) = last(ρ′) = x♯y (note that such a suffix always exists by construction of Tfin(x♯v0)).
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Let Let lmax = max{|y| | x♯y ∈ Occ(ρ′)} and let Lρ = {x♯y | |y| = lmax}. If there exists
x′♯y′ ∈ Lρ such that {y′} ∈ F then we label the leaf x♯y with F . Otherwise we label it with
F¯ .
We now label the entire Tfin(x♯v0) with F or F¯ and construct (memoryless) strategies
µi : LA → LA, i ∈ M using the following backward induction procedure.
Procedure 1
Suppose all children of node x♯yv of Tfin(x♯v0) have been labelled. Let Tx♯yv be the set of
children of x♯yv and let TFx♯yv ⊆ Tx♯yv be the nodes among these children that have been
labelled with F . Then
• v ∈ Vi such that i ∈ M:
– If TFx♯yv 6= ∅ then let x
′♯y′v′ be such that v′ ≺ v′′ for all x′′♯y′′v′′ ∈ TFx♯yv. Label
x♯yv with F and put µi(x♯yv) = x
′♯y′v′.
– If TFx♯yv = ∅ then let x
′♯y′v′ ∈ Tx♯yv be such that v
′ ≺ v′′ for all x′′♯y′′v′′ ∈ Tx♯yv.
Label x♯yv with F¯ and put µi(x♯yv) = x
′♯y′v′.
• v ∈ Vi such that i /∈ M:
– If TFx♯yv = Tx♯yv, which means that every child of x♯yv is labelled F , then label
x♯yv with F .
– If TFx♯yv ( Tx♯yv then there exists a child x
′♯y′v′ of x♯yv such that x′♯y′v′ has label
F¯ . Label x♯yv with F¯ .
Note that, choosing the least v in the order ≺ in the above procedure ensures that the µi’s
constructed are well defined.
Players M are said to be able to ensure the Muller sets F by strategy µi, i ∈ M on
Tfin(x♯v0) if the root of Tfin(x♯v0) is labelled F by the above procedure and µi are the strate-
gies constructed.
Given a memoryless strategy µi for player i on an LAR tree Tfin(x♯y) we can construct
the corresponding bounded memory strategy σi for player i on the arena A as follows:
• The memory M of σi is the set LA and the initial memory mI is x♯y.
• Thememory update function gi : V×M → M is defined as gi(v, x
′♯y′) = next(x′♯y′, v).
• The output function hi : Vi ×M → V is defined as h(v, x
′♯y) = µi(x
′♯y).
For a word on notation, we denote memoryless strategies on Tfin(·) by µ and we denote
the bounded memory strategies on the arena A by σ.
A strategy σ on the arenaA is said to exist in Tfin(x♯y) if it corresponds to some strategy
µ on Tfin(x♯y). A strategy µ is said to exist in Tfin(x♯y) if it is some subtree of Tfin(x♯y).
LEMMA 1. If players M ( N, M 6= ∅ can ensure Muller sets F in Tfin(x♯v0) by strate-
gies µi, i ∈ M, then they can ensure F in (G, v0) by the bounded memory strategies σi
corresponding to µi.
PROOF. Suppose not and suppose that players M can ensure F in Tfin(x♯v0) by µi, i ∈ M
but they cannot ensure F in (G, v0) by the corresponding strategies σi. Then there exists a
play pi in (G, v0) conforming to σi, i ∈ M such that it settles down to a Muller set F
′ /∈ F .
There are two cases to consider.
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The first case is when there exists v ∈ F′ such that v /∈ F for any F ∈ F . Let j be the first
index such that pi(j) = v and pi(j− 1) ∈ Vk, k /∈ M. Let ρ be the (finite) path in Tfin(x♯v0)
corresponding to pi. j must be greater than |ρ|; otherwise ρ couldn’t have been labelled F
and hence µi’s couldn’t have ensured F . Let x
′♯y′=LAR(pij−1). By the construction of the
LAR tree Tfin(x♯v0) there exists a node x
′♯y′ ∈ ρ itself. But this means that player k had the
option of playing v at the node x′♯y′ forcing x′♯y′ and hence the root to be labelled F¯ . But
this would contradict the fact that µi’s ensure F in Tfin(x♯v0).
The other case is when there exists v ∈ F ∈ F such that v /∈ F′. Let ρ be the (finite) path
in Tfin(x♯v0) corresponding to pi. Let l be the biggest index l such that pi(l) = v but l < |ρ|.
Suppose pi(l − 1) ∈ Vi, i ∈ M. Then for all indices l1, l2, . . . such that l < l1 < l2 < . . .
and LAR(pil1)= LAR(pil2)=. . . = LAR(pil−1), player i has to play v as it is prescribed by the
memoryless strategy µi, and hence in turn by the corresponding bounded memory strategy
σi. But this contradicts the fact that the pi settles down to F
′.
Finally, suppose pi(l − 1) ∈ Vk, k /∈ M. Then player k has the option of playing v at
pi(l− 1) and al all indices l1, l2, . . . such that l < l1 < l2 < . . . and LAR(pil1)= LAR(pil2)=. . . =
LAR(pil−1). Hence µi’s could not have ensured F in Tfin(x♯v0) as the leaf node of ρ wouldn’t
have been labelled F and hence neither the root.
LEMMA 2. Let F be a collection of Muller sets. If players M ( N, M 6= ∅ have strategies
σi, i ∈ M to ensure F in the game (G, v0), then they have strategies µi, i ∈ M to ensure F in
Tfin(x♯v0).
PROOF. Suppose players M do not have strategies µi, i ∈ M to ensure F in Tfin(x♯v0) then
Tfin(x♯v0) being a finite tree (and hence a finite extensive form game) it follows that players
N \ M have strategies µi, i ∈ N \ M to ensure 2
V \ F in Tfin(x♯v0), since finite games are
determined. Then by Lemma 1, players N \ M have bounded memory strategies σi, i ∈
N \M corresponding to the µi’s to ensure 2
V \ F in (G, v0) as well. But this contradicts the
assumption that players M have strategies to ensure F in (G, v0).
Combining the above two lemmata, we have the following theorem.
THEOREM 3. Let (G, v0) be an n-player game, N being the set of players. Let M ( N, M 6=
∅ be a subset of players and F be a collection of a Muller sets consisting of the nodes of the
arena of the game. Then players M can ensure F in (G, v0) if and only if they can ensure
F in Tfin(x♯v0). Also, if players M can ensure F in Tfin(x♯v0) then the bounded memory
strategies σi, i ∈ M corresponding to the memoryless strategies µi, i ∈ M computed by
Procedure 1, ensures F in (G, v0).
3.3 Equilibrium Computation
Let (G, v0) be a generalised Muller game with the set of players N and let ui be the utility
function of player i over the Muller sets. We label the leaf nodes of the LAR tree Tfin(x♯v0)
consistently with tuples (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ N
n as follows.
For a leaf node x♯y of Tfin(x♯v0), let ρ be the unique path in Tfin(x♯v0) from the root
to x♯y. Let ρ′ be the least suffix of ρ such that first(ρ′) = last(ρ′) = x♯y. Let lmax =
max{|y| | x♯y ∈ Occ(ρ′)} and let Lρ = {x♯y | |y| = lmax}. Observe that, by the property
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of the LAR construction y = y′ for all x♯y, x′♯y′ ∈ Lρ. Let Y = y′ such that x′♯y′ ∈ Lρ. Label
the leaf x♯y with (u1(Y), . . . , un(Y)).
We now label the entire tree Tfin consistently, with tuples (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ N
n, and com-
pute a strategy tuple µ¯ = (µ1, . . . , µn) as follows:
Procedure 2
Suppose all children of node x♯yv have been labelled and v ∈ Vi. Let
ux♯yv = max{ui(x
′♯y′) | x′♯y′ is a child of x♯yv},
Tx♯yv = {x
′♯y′ | x′♯y′ is a child of x♯yv and ui(x
′♯y′) = ux♯yv}.
Put µi(x♯yv) = x
′♯y′v′ ∈ Tx♯yv such that v
′ ≺ v′′ for all x′′♯y′′v′′ ∈ Tx♯yv. Label x♯yv with
(u1(x
′♯y′v′), . . . , un(x′♯y′v′)).
THEOREM 4. Every generalised Muller game (G, v0) has a Nash equilibrium.
The proof shows that the bounded memory strategy tuple (σ1, . . . , σn) corresponding
to the tuple (µ1, . . . , µn) constructed by Procedure 2, is an equilibrium tuple in the game
(G, v0). The essence of the proof is the same as the one for Theorem 3: player i has an in-
centive to deviate from σi in (G, v0) if and only if she has an incentive to deviate from µi in
Tfin(x♯yv0). We omit the full proof due to space limitations.
Complexity. Let the number of vertices in the arena A be m. In Procedure 2, the number of
permutations of the m vertices of the arena is equal to m. Thus the size of the LAR memory
LA may be as big as (m + 1)!. This means that each path of the LAR tree might be (m + 1)!
nodes long. As there are O(mm!) such paths and the backward induction procedure runs in
time linear in the size of the LAR tree, the running time of Procedure 2 is O(mm!).
4 Subgame Perfection
Nash equilibrium, as a solution concept, has its limitations. One such limitation is that it
does not take into account the sequential nature of the game. In an extensive form game,
if a player deviates from equilibrium behaviour even for just one move, Nash equilibrium
says nothing about the outcome of the game. One possible refinement to Nash equilibrium
is to insist that strategies are optimal after every prefix. This is achieved by subgame per-
fect equilibrium [8]. Ummels [9] has shown that subgame perfect equilibria always exist
for n-player infinite games on graphs for ω-regular win-lose objectives. The question there-
fore arises whether subgame perfect equilibria exist for n-player infinite games where the
objectives are not win-lose but generalised.
For finite extensive form games, the backward induction procedure does indeed yield
a subgame perfect equilibrium profile. Since our construction of the equilibrium profile
for generalised Muller games employs a backward induction procedure (Procedure 2), it is
natural to ask if the profile constructed is subgame perfect. The answer is affirmative for
win-lose objectives as we show in the following proposition.
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PROPOSITION 5. Every generalised Muller game with binary objectives has a subgame
perfect equilibrium.
PROOF. We show that the strategy tuple σ¯ corresponding to the tuple µ¯ constructed by
Procedure 2 is a subgame perfect equilibrium of (G, v0) when the objectives of the players
are binary.
Suppose σ¯ is not an SPE. Then there exists a vertex v ∈ V, v ∈ Vi say, and a path ρ from
v0 to v such that µ¯(ρ) is not an equilibrium tuple. Let ρ′ be the (finite) path in Tfin(x♯v0)
corresponding to ρ.
Suppose player j has an incentive to deviate from σj(ρ). If |ρ| < |ρ
′|, then player j has
an incentive to deviate from µj as well. But this contradicts the fact that µ¯ is an equilibrium
tuple (Theorem 3).
So assume that |ρ| ≥ |ρ′ |. Then by the property of the LAR tree Tfin(x♯v0), there exists
ρ′′ such that |ρ′′| < |ρ′| and LAR(ρ′′) = LAR(ρ). Now, since σ¯j corresponds to µ¯j which is
a memoryless strategy constructed from Tfin(x♯v0), it prescribes the same action at ρ and
ρ′′ (since LAR(ρ′′) = LAR(ρ)). Thus if player j has an incentive to deviate from σj(ρ), she
has an incentive to deviate from σj(ρ
′′) as well which in turn means she has an incentive
to deviate from σj in the first place. But this again contradicts fact that σ¯ is an equilibrium
tuple (Theorem 3).
The argument for the above proof breaks down when the objectives of the players are
not binary but generalised.
3 1 2 4
in
in
out out
Figure 1: Non existence of subgame perfect equilibrium
Example 1 Consider the game arena shown in Figure 1. Player 1 nodes are denoted by©
and player 2 nodes are denoted by 2. The game starts at node 1. The utilities of the players
for the relevant Muller sets are as follows: u1({3}) = 1, u1({1, 2}) = 0, u1({4}) = 2 and
u2({3}) = 0, u2({1, 2}) = 2, u2({4}) = 1. Procedure 2 gives the following strategies µ1 and
µ2 for players 1 and 2 respectively. µ1 prescribes that player 1 stays ‘in’ in her first move ex-
pecting player 2 to go ‘out’ and hence give 1 a better payoff. But if she plays ‘in’ then player
2 stays ‘in’ as prescribed by µ2 because that gives her a better payoff. To this 1 assumes that
player 2 will stay in forever and hence plays ‘out’ in her next move as prescribed by µ1. The
profile (µ1, µ2) is thus not subgame perfect. One can verify that the above game does not
have a subgame perfect equilibrium.
The above example shows that in general subgame perfect equilibria need not exist for
generalised Muller games. Thus an obvious question to ask would be: Is it decidable to
check whether subgame perfect equilibrium exists in a given generalised Muller game? In
this section, we develop a procedure to decide the existence of sub-game perfect equilibrium
and to compute the equilibrium profile when it exists.
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First, it is important to note that given an arena A and an initial vertex v, for any
bounded memory strategy on A that uses memory LA the initial element of LA does not
matter. In other words, no matter what element x♯y such that last(x♯y) = v of LA we take
as the root of the LAR tree, the backward induction procedure (Procedure 2) gives all the
bounded memory strategies that are possible by using memory LA and updating it as de-
scribed in Section 3. This is because starting from any vertex v of A, the tree explores all
possible cycles reachable from v and a path of the LAR tree is terminated if and only if a
cycle is completed.
Define the following property for a strategy tuple µ¯ on Tfin(x♯v0)
Property 1 For every x♯y ∈ Tfin(x♯v0), there exists a strategy tuple µ¯
′ on Tfin(x♯y) such that µ¯
′ is
derived by backward induction on Tfin(x♯y) and µ¯
′(x♯y) = µ¯(x♯y).
Given an game (G, v0), let Path(G, v0) be the set of all finite paths starting at v0 in G.
Define P : L→ 2Path(G,v0) such that P(x♯y) = {ρ ∈ Path(G, v0) | LAR(ρ) = x♯y}.
Given a strategy tuple σ¯ on (G, v0) define Qσ¯ : L → 22
V
as Qσ¯(x♯y) = {inf(piσ¯(ρ)) | ρ ∈
P(x♯y)}where piσ¯(ρ) is the play conforming to σ¯(ρ). Let Cσ¯ be a choice function Cσ¯ : L→ 2
V
such that
Property 2 x′♯y′ is a child of x♯y in Tfin(x♯v0) and Cσ¯(x♯y) ∈ Qσ¯(x
′♯y′) implies Cσ¯(x′♯y′) =
Cσ¯(x♯y).
It follows that
Property 3 If Cσ¯(x♯yv) = F, v ∈ Vi then there actually exists a ρ ∈ Path(G, v0) such that
LAR(ρ)= x♯yv, inf(piσ¯(ρ)) = F, σi(ρ) = v and inf(piσ¯(ρv)) = F.
Assume for themoment that given any strategy tuple σ¯, we have such a function Cσ¯ sat-
isfying Property 2. Now let σ¯ be an SPE on (G, v0). For every i ∈ N, construct σ′i as follows:
σ′i : V
∗Vi → V such that σ
′
i (uv) = uvv
′ iff Cσ¯(LAR(uv)) = Cσ¯(LAR(uvv′)), (v, v′) ∈ E
LEMMA 6. σ¯′ is an SPE on (G, v0)
PROOF. Suppose not. Then there exists ρ ∈ Path(G, v0) such that σ¯′(ρ) is not an NE. So
suppose player i has an incentive to deviate from σ′i (ρ). Now by property 3 there exists a
history ρ′ ∈ Path(G, v0) such that σ′i (ρ) = σi(ρ
′). Then player i must have an incentive to
deviate from σi(ρ
′) itself. But this contradicts the subgame perfection of σ¯.
Now σ¯′ exists on Tfin(x♯v0). Indeed, it is the strategy where σ
′
i (x♯y) = x
′♯y′ such that
x♯y is a parent of x′♯y′ in Tfin(x♯v0) and Cσ¯(x♯y) = Cσ¯(x
′♯y′). Let µ¯′ denote this memoryless
strategy tuple on Tfin(x♯v0) corresponding to σ¯′.
LEMMA 7. µ¯′ has Property 1
PROOF. Suppose not. Then there exists a node x♯y ∈ Tfin(x♯v0) such that for any back-
ward induction strategy profile µ¯+ on Tfin(x♯y), µ¯′(x♯y) 6= µ¯
+(x♯y). Now we have that
σ¯′ is subgame perfect on (G, v0) and bounded memory, the memory being LA. So µ¯′(x♯y)
must correspond to some equilibrium tuple σ¯′ on (G, last(x♯y)) which exists in Tfin(x♯y), as
backward induction on Tfin(x♯y) gives all the bounded memory equilibria starting at node
last(x♯y) with memory LA. But then the above cannot happen.
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LEMMA 8. If a strategy tuple µ¯ on Tfin(x♯v0) satisfies Property 1 then σ¯ on (G, v0) corre-
sponding to µ¯ is an SPE.
PROOF. Suppose not. Then there exists ρ ∈ Path(G, v0) such that σ¯(ρ) is not an equilibrium
on (G, last(ρ)). Let LAR(ρ)=x♯y. Now x♯y ∈ Tfin(x♯v0) and σ¯(ρ) is bounded memory, the
memory being LA. Thus µ¯(ρ) corresponding to σ¯(ρ) cannot be a backward induction profile
on Tfin(x♯y) as backward induction on Tfin(x♯y) gives all the bounded memory equilibria
starting at node last(x♯y) with memory LA. So µ¯ cannot satisfy Property 1.
From the above set of lemmata we have the following theorem.
THEOREM 9. A generalised Muller game (G, v0) has a subgame perfect equilibrium if and
only if there exists a strategy profile µ¯ on Tfin(x♯v0) that satisfies Property 1.
PROOF. It only remains to construct the choice function Cσ¯ satisfying Property 2 given a
strategy profile σ¯. We do that as follows: let ⋖ be a breadth-first ordering on Tfin(x♯v0) and
let H = ∅.
Till H 6= Tfin(x♯v0) do
• Let x♯y be the minimum in the ordering (Tfin(x♯v0) \ H) ↾ ⋖.
• Let ρ be the path from the root to x♯y.
• Let Cσ¯(x♯y) = inf(piσ¯(ρ)) = F.
• There exists a path ρ′ from x♯y to a leaf node of Tfin(x♯v0) such that for all x
′♯y′ ∈
ρ′, F ∈ Qσ¯(LAR(x′♯y′)). Put Cσ¯(x′♯y′) = F for all such x′♯y′ ∈ ρ′. Let H = H ∪
{x′♯y′ | x′♯y′ ∈ ρ′}.
• For all x′♯y′ ∈ Tfin(x♯v0) such that x
′♯y′ /∈ ρ′ and such that LAR(x′♯y′) = LAR(x′′♯y′′)
for some x′′♯y′′ ∈ ρ′, put Cσ¯(x′♯y′) = Cσ¯(x′′♯y′′). Let H = H ∪ {x′♯y′}.
It is immediate that the Cσ¯ constructed above meets Property 2.
The above theorem immediately gives us the following procedure to test if a gener-
alised Muller game has a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Procedure:
For every backward induction strategy profile µ¯ on Tfin(x♯v0)
For all x♯y ∈ Tfin(x♯v0) such that x♯y 6= x♯v0
If µ¯(x♯y) 6= µ¯+(x♯y) for some backward induction strategy profile µ¯+
on Tfin(x♯y), then return TRUE and exit
Return FALSE
Complexity: Let |V| = m. There are at most 1+m+m2 + . . .+mm! = (mm!+1− 1)/(m− 1)
nodes in an LAR tree. There are atmost m · m2 · . . .mm! = mm!(m!+1)/2 strategy tuples in
an LAR tree. Hence the complexity of the above procedure is O((mm!+1 − 1)/(m − 1) ·
mm!(m!+1)/2 · (mm!+1− 1)/(m− 1)) = O(m2m! ·m(m!)
2
).
5 Discussion
Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium are well studied in finite games. In the
setting of finite games, subgame perfection is justified under the trembling hand assump-
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tion and a subgame perfect profile is considered more robust than general Nash equilib-
rium profiles. When we move to nonzero sum games of infinite duration even coming up
with an appropriate notion of rationality which justifies the trembling hand assumption is
a challenging task. However, the equilibrium notions are mathematically well defined and
deserves attention in their own right. In this paper rather than delve into issues concerning
rationality, we have attempted to investigate equilibrium notions in the context of infinite
games. We have shown that the standard technique of backward induction can be appro-
priately modified to compute equilibrium profile in generalised Muller games. Though the
running time complexity of the procedures is not very encouraging, we would like to view
this as a generic technique for solving games.
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